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The introduction of the round-the-world serives by
United States Line and Evergreen Maritime Corporation has
not only injected a new concept of international shipping
in the transport industry but also brought in a heavy
overtonnage situation in certain liner trade markets. The
deployment of a large fleet of modern and sizable
containerships will put Evergreen and USL the no. 1 and
no. 2 largest containership operators.in January 1987. The
services have shown a number of operational advantages
including economy of scale and marketing merits. However,
the survival of these expensive operations requires a
huge base of cargo support. In this paper, the writer
analyses the plus and minus points of the services and put
forword a general proposal for future operation of the
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What follows is a preliminary analysis of the
round-the-world shipping services. It is intended for those
readers who are interested in international shipping,
particularly in modern shipping management. Being one of the
very few research papers of the same kind, the paper
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material has been reduced to a minimum.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Traditional liner shipping, whether it is breakbulk or
containerized, has been developed on a shuttle routing
basis. That is, fixed number of vessels are being locked-in
in a specific trade to operate between two areas.
Presently, the world container traffic is mainly moved in
the following trades:
(in descending order of container capacity)
- Far East/West Coast of North America and vice versa,
- North America/Europe and vice versa,
- Europe/Africa and vice versa,
- Far East/Europe and vice versa,
- Far East/East Coast of North America and vice versa,
- Europe/Middle East,
- Japan/Asia and vice versa, and
- North America/Middle East,
These routes are estimated to stand for over 70% percent of
worldwide container traffic.
During the recent two years, two major international
shipping lines, United States Lines (of USA) and Evergreen
1WQLh-C2niaioatizaiiQn-1284- Japan Maritime Research
Institute, June 1984, P•19.
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Maritime Corporation (of Taiwan), have moved away from the
shuttle concept and introduced independently the round-
the-world services. USL runs an eastbound service with
routing of Far East- USA West Coast- USA East Coast-
Europe- via Suez- Arabian Gulf- Indian Sub-Continent-
Far East by twelve huge containerships with capacity of
3,800 TEU each. Evergreen runs two round-the-world
services one is similar to USL's eastbound service and the
other is a westbound service with routing of Far East-
Arabian Gulf- via Suez- Europe- USA East Coast- USA West
Coast- Far East, by eleven containerships of 2,700 TEU each
in each direction.
There are two obvious advantages of these round-the-
world services:
(i) These services route through the major container
traffic routes and have a very large potential marke-
base•
(ii) As a result of (i), the shipping lines can afford to
inject very large containerships in the service and can
reap the benefits by the economy of scale. Particular-
ly, the ships used in the services were purchased under
favourable financial terms at a time when shipyard
prices were depressed. The accumulative effect of
these elements has led to estimates of per TEU mile
Twenty-footer Equivalent Unit- a commonly used
measuring unit of ship's size.
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costs of as low as US$ 4/4.5 cents1 for USL and 3.5/4
cents for Evergreen. Such figures are well below the
6.5/9.5 cents per TEU mile of a 1,500 TEU European-flag
containerships or the 1,800 TEU containerships of
Whether or not other operators will be influenced to
mount their own round-the-world services has yet to be
demonstrated, although many of the major operators have
already given the concept serious consideration. Reportedly
Orient Overseas Container Lines (of Hong Kong, C. Y. Tung
Group) and Neptune Orient Line (of Singapore) will be intro-
ducing their eastbound round-the-world services, similar to
USL's. very Snnn.
Another possible scenario might be for some
international carriers to launch a round-the-world service
by chartering slots on each other's vessels so as to realize
operating economies and whilst covering markets which they
do not presently serve with their existing schedules. As no
additional hardware is involved in this type of operation,
the writer shall not further elaborate on this slot-charter
round-the-world service in this paper.




Since the service is a completely new concept, there
has never been any official study issued on this subject.
Research Departments of major shipping companies are
independently conducting surveys on these routes. Firstly,
the background data as published in various (shipping)
professional magazines and trade journals will be examined.
Particularly the size of the vessels and the details of
operation pattern are to a large extent related to the
economy of the operations. These analyses, together with
the estimation of costings, will present a fair idea of the
breakeven turnover level of a service.
Secondly, the writer, in business contacts with the
executives of Orient Overseas Container Lines and American
President Lines shall arrange interviews with the Research
Departments of these two companies and shall obtain some
first hand information as regards the rationale and problems
of the round-the-world service and, more importantly, their
expectation toward the future of the service.
Based on the outcome of the above research, the writer
attempts to bring out the common areas of merits/demerits of
a round-the-world service, its most important problems, its
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possible solutions and its possible effect to the future of
world shipping.
There are three areas worthwhile to be further pursued
in the following chapters:
(i) The round-the-world service has completely changed the
concept of traditional shipping and brought with it
different patterns of revenue generating sources and
operating costs. Various international lines are
having a wait-and-see attitude whether they would like
to follow suit. The writer attempts to point out a
number of essential areas in this respect.
(ii) Evergreen and USL, according to the survey conducted by
1
Containerization International, as a result of their
employing huge containerships in their new round-the-
world services, shall become the largest and
second largest containership operators respectively in
the world by January 1987. A list of the top twenty
operators is shown in Appendix 1. The container liner
shipping community is fearful that a combination of
Evergreen's and USL's lower per TEU costs and their
introduction of possibly up to two million additional
TEU on an annual basis into the arterial trades by 1986
would depress freight rates, unless there would be
significant growth-in the world trade, or more specif-
ically an expansion of US exports to Asia, Europe and
1
Containerization Internatioal. Sept, 1985 P-29.
the Far East. Most at risk in this context are the
heavily overtonnaged westbound transpacific and east-
bound transatlantic trades. However, the most bitter
skirmishes todate have come from the Europe/Far East
and v.v, trades, where Evergreen and Far East Freight
Conference (FEFC) have each accused one another of
vicious rate cutting. These increased supply of
services shall create adverse effect in the already
depressed freight markets. The writer shall try to
identify and quantify the problems of overtonnage and
its possible damages,
(iii) The costly operation of the round-the-world services
requires a consistent voluminous level of cargo support
to maintain a financially feasible service. The writer
shall analyze the costings of the service, the required
earnings level and its immediate (financial) problems.
7CHAPTER III
OPERATION PATTERN- THE SIMILARITIES
AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN USL AND EVERGREEN
United States Lines
United States Lines is wholly owned by McLean
1
Securities Inc. with headquarters in New Jersey, USA and
regional headquarters in London and Hong Kong, USL has been
serving the Far East/USA (i.e. Transpacific) trade for over
30 years. It announced its round-the-world service plan in
1982 and placed orders of twelve large containerships, the
so-called Jumbo Econships, with Daewoo Shipbuilding
Heavy Machinery Ltd. of South Korea. The vessels are
designed to accommodate primarily 2,241 forty-footer
containers (including 146 refrigerated cells), although due
to the deadweight capacity, the actual carryings should not
exceed 1,900 forty-footers (i.e. 3,800 TEU). The total
contract prices are reportedly around US$ 570 million. Nine
of the total twelve ships have already been delivered to USL
and have been serving the round-the-world service. These
Jumbo Econships are named:
American Maine delivered Aug., 1984
American Alabama Sept., 1984
McLean Securities operates as a holding company with
four principal subsidiaries, i.e. USL, Moore McCormack,
Purcell and First Colony. In the four, USL is the
most important subsidiary, contributing 97% of revenue.
1
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American New Jersey Oct., 1984
American New York Nov., 1984
American Virginia Jan., 1985
American Kentucky Jane, 1985
American Nebraska Mar., 1985
American Oklahoma Jun, 1985
American Illinois Oct., 1985
American California Dec., 1985
Feb., 1986American Utah
American Washington April, 1986
Routing
The present routing of USL is New York- Felixstowe-
Jeddah- Khor Fakkan- Singapore- Hong Kong- Kaohsiung-
Busan- Kobe- Yokohama- Los Angeles- Savannah- Norfolk-
New York. The total round voyage takes about 12 weeks and,
when its twelve ships are fully operational, USL will
maintain a weekly service in all direct calling ports. In
the highly competitive liner shipping markets, particularly
those to and from USA, frequency of service is a major
marketing tool a punctual weekly schedule, which is a
better product than its competitors, would improve USL's
marketability in the transpacific trade (which is by far the
largest liner traffic worldwide).
In addition to the above call ports, USL plans to also
serve other major ports by transhipment services (in
shipping term, feeder services). A total of fifteen
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feeder services have been announced by USL during the past
two years. These feeder services are to connect the round-
the-world (mother) service and all feeders are operated on a
shuttle basis. These services are:
(i) USA East Coast- Venezuela- South America East Coast
(ii) USA Gulf Coast- Venezuela- South America East Coast
(iii) Felixstowe- Northwest Continent
(iv) Felixstowe- Northern Europe (Hamburg, Gothenburg)
(v) Khor Fakkan- Arabian Gulf Ports
(vi) Khor Fakkan- West Coast of India
(vii) Singapore- Southeast Asia
(viii) Singapore- Indian Sub-Continent (East Coast)
(ix) Singapore- Indian Sub-Continent (West Coast)
(x) Hong Kong- China





One would notice that USL is using a routing strategy
of running a East- West mother service to cover major ports
in the northern hemisphere, whilst maintaining a number of
South- North feeder services to cover the relatively minor
ports. This modus operandi has supported USL to cater for
cargo virtually from any point in the world to any other
point. The potential market of USL's (as well as




Not surprisingly, the vessels are characterised by
their relatively long and skinny profile, given their
enormous capacity constrained by Panama Canal breadth
restrictions. At 289.5 meter LOA and a 32.218 meters
breadth the vessels have an length/breadth ratio of just on
9.0 compared to traditional Panamax values (whether
container or breakbulk carriers) of 7.75 or less. Titak
container capacity of the ships is a quoted 2,241 FEU (forty
footers) of which 1.344 FEU can be carried below decks and
897 as deck stow. Several of the cargo holds and deck bays
have been configured for both 20 ft, and 40 ft, unit
stowage. A relatively meagre 146 slots are equipped to
handle refrigerated boxes.
There are 17 cargo bays on the foredeck and an
additional two abaft the accommodation. Each is subdivided
into three hatches athwartships with hatchcovers being steel
pontoons. Throughout the main midship section of the
vessel, boxes are stacked eight-high below decks in 10
across bays. Above-deck stowage is four high and 13 across.
Service speed is 18.0 knots. Quoted fuel consumption under
these conditions is 73.7 tons/day.
In terms of fuel oil consumption, the Jumbo Econships
1
burn 0.0194 ton per TEU day which is extremely low as
1
Shipbuilding Facelay March,1984 P.112.
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compared with 0.0297 ton per TEU day of a popular 1,180 TEU
RoRo containership or 0.0257 ton per TEU day of a general
third generation containership. Furthermore, the ship, in
view of its modern equipment onboard, is only manned by 21
crew members- the same number of crew of any other ships
with one-half of even one third of its capacity.
the above figures clearly show the reason why these
huge containerships are called Jumbo Econ(omic)ships.
Evergreen Maritime Corporation
Evergreen Maritime Corporation is a Taiwan shipping
company based in Taipei with regional headoffices in London
and New York* The owner, Mr. Chang Yang-fa, has established
this company in late sixties to mainly serve the
transpacific trade and Far East/Europe trade. Subsidiary
companies of Evergreen are Union Glory Maritime (85%
ownership), Evermaster Ind. Corp., Evervalor Corp.,
Everocean Industrial and Container Leasing Company, Ltd.
Evergreen announced its shipbuilding programme in end-
February, 1982 and it was the depressed period of worldwide
shipbuilding. The announcement has shocked the
international shipping and shipbuilding industries. A whole
new fleet of twenty-two third generation containerships will
be the ever largest order by a single private company of
containership in history. Each ship is to carry 2,728 TEU,
43,000 deadweight tonnes. The ships were/are being built by
Japanese shipbuilders. Twenty out of twenty-two ships were
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already delivered to Evergreen. The ships were named:
Ever Guard delivered June, 1983
Ever Guide July, 1983
Ever Going Sep., 1983
Ever Glory Feb., 1984
Ever Grade March, 1984
Ever Giant April, 1982
Ever Gather May, 1984
Ever Globe June, 1984
Ever Grace July, 1984
Ever Garden July, 1984
Ever Genius July, 1984
Ever Greet Aug., 1984
Ever Gentry Aug*, 1984











The total contract price is estimated at around US$ 990
million (at 1983 price level). As it was discussed in
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Chapter II of this paper, these twenty-two containerships
have put Evergreen into world no. 1 position of
containership operator by January 1987 when the deliveries
of the ships are completed.
Routing
Twenty-two containerships are separated into two groups
to run two independent services, one eastbound and one
westbound.
Eastbound service: Keelung- Busan- Osaka- Tokyo- Los
Angeles- Kingston- Charleston- New York- Baltimore-
Hamburg- Felixstowe- Rotterdam- Antwerp- Le Harve-
Valencia- Port Kelang (Kuala Lumpur)- Singapore- Hong
Kong- Kaohsiung- Keelung.
Westbound service: Keelung- Kaohsiung- Hong Kong-
Singapore- Valencia- Hamburg- Felixstowe- Rotterdam-
Antwerp- Le Harve- New York- Norfolk- Kingston- Tokyo-
Osaka- Busan- Keelung.
Both routings are scheduled to run 77 days round
voyages. When all twenty two vessels are deployed,
Evergreen shall offer a weekly service in each port covered
in the above schedule.
Feeder Operation
Evergreen runs a relatively small feeder network to
connect its mother vessels. There are presently three
feeder services in operation:
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(i) Far East feeder- Kaohsiung is the transhipment port
to feeder cargo to other Far East destinations
including Manila, Bangkok and Indonesia.
(ii) Caribbean feeder- Kingston is used as the centre of
transhipment of Caribbean cargo to and from Cristobal,
Aruba, Curacao, San Juan, Santo Domingo and Houston.
(iii) West Mediterranean Sea feeder- Leghorn, Genoa and
Fos cargoes are to be transhipped via Valencia.
The routing strategies of USL and Evergreen are
similar, i.e. mother services to cover major ports and
feeder services to look after minor ports by transhipment.
Should we add up the main services and the feeder services
of both round-the-world operators, we are able to see the
major similarities and differences of both services.
Similarities
Both services are running a West-East service in the
northern hemisphere, directly calling at all major ports
worldwide. Both companies are applying the same strategies
in the following areas:
(i) USL and Evergreen are using fully-cellular non-geared
vessels in their services. That is, they both have to
rely on shore-based facilities to handle containers.
Therefore, these vessels are not equipped to call at
port without proper container handling equipments.
(ii) As regards the feeder services, both companies adopt
a transhipment centre concept. USL uses Khor Fakkan
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as a centre point for Middle East cargo, Felixstowe
for European cargo, Singapore for Southeast Asia.cargo
and Hong Kong for China transhipment cargo whilst
Evergreen uses Kaohsiung as a transhipment centre for
Far Eastern ports, Kingston for Caribbean Sea ports
and Valencia for Mediterranean Sea ports.
Differences
Besides the above points, there are some basic
differences in business philosophy of these two companies.
It also relates to individual lines' historical market
position in different trades:
(i) The schedule of Evergreen directly covers major
European ports whilst USL mainly covers Europe by
feeders (except Felixstowe).
(ii) Evergreen does not schedule to call at any Arabian
Gulf or Red Sea ports but USL vessels are directly
calling at Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and Khor Fakkan
(United Arab Emirates).
(iii) Evergreen's routing covers a Caribbean port
(Kingston) whilst USL's vessels bypass Caribbean Sea.
(iv) China cargo due to political reason, Evergreen
cannot cater for China cargo USL, however, serves
China cargo on a transhipment basis (via Hong Kong).
It indicates that in the relatively minor routes, two
lines are having different priorities. Evergreen has been
strong in the Far East/Europe and Far East/Caribbean Sea
16
markets and, therefore, offer a better product (than USL's)
in these areas. Similarly, USL has been historically
involved in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Sub-Continent trades
and is to serve these areas on a direct basis.
1CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION-
:-)*UPPLY AND DEMAND OF TONNAGE
In general, demand for shipping services results from
demand for goods. In this sense it is called derived
demand for without demand for goods there would be no
demand for shipping services which constitute an important
element of the production process. The demand for shipping
services, and, consequently, for ships is a result of
several factors such as: the size and structure of
international trade, distance of transport, productivity of
ships, cargo preferences and other forms of protectionism,
volume of stocks of raw materials of major importers etc.
Supply of shipping services is determined by the size
and structure of the fleet in service, average time of
operation and productivity of shipping.
Supply Effect of
The Round-the-World Service
In Chapter II, it is mentioned that in view of the
injection of large containerships in the round-the-world
services, Evergreen and USL will become the first and second
largest containership operators in January 1987. USL will
bring in a total of 4,482 TEU x 12 vessels= 53,784 TEU
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(which is around 136% of its present fleet capacity) into
the world containership fleet. Evergreen will inject a total
of 2,700 TEU x 22 vessels= 59,400 TEU (which is also around
136% of its current capacity). By comparing these
injections with the present (December, 1985) world
1
containership capacity of 2,212,000 TEU, the
round-the-world services will increase the supply of
containership services by some 5%. This figure does not look
too impressive however, when it is further looked at the
increase of such capacity in some particular trades in which
the cargo volume is small, such increase of supply will
materially influence the stability of market place and
affect the pricing of services to a large extent.
To further evaluate the influence of the round-the-
world services, we would separately analyse three major
markets covered by the services, namely the transpacific
trade, the transatlantic trade (Atlantic- Europe) and
Europe- Middle East trade.
The Transpacific Trade
The transpacific is a bad example the trade has
presently undergone a throat-cutting freight war. Due to
the strong US Dollar position during the most part of 1985
and the self-imposed exports restricted system by Japan, the
transpacific trade has been static during the latter part of
World total TEU capacity as at Jan. 1986- see Appendix 1.
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1984 and 1985. All lines operating in the transpacific
trade have to compete against each other for limited cargo
mainly on pricing. The addition of tonnage by USL and
Evergreen is adding insults to injury. In view of the fact
that the efforts of USL to fill the 4,482 TEU ships
have had a disruptive effect, the US carrier's
competitors found it extremely difficult to discern a
consistent pricing policy being followed by USL. Table 4.1
below shows a comparison of 40-footer rates for selected
commodities moving between selected Asian countries and
North American coasts.
Table 4.1 Comparison of freight rates
between January 1 and July 1 of 1985:
Commodity Country/US Coast FEU rates (US$) %








-41%3,460 2,060Hand Tools Taiwan/Pacific
-20%4,675 3,755TV and Video Korea/Pacific
-43%3,795 2,160Philippines/PacFootwear
-47%Singapore/Pacific 3,130 1,660Housewares
The above effect is a typical result of static demand
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of shipping services because of limited increase of cargo
flows and the massive increase of supply of shipping
services resulting from, among others, injection of USL and
Evergreen round-the-world service vessels.
The westbound traffic of the transpacific trade does
iot look any better. An analysis made by the TWRA
(Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement, the agreement covers
all westbound trades from USA to Far East countries) as
Shown in Figure 4.1 clearly shows the demand of shipping
services does not meet the supply of shipping services
articularly during the period of 1985 to 1987 when
:vergreen shall phase in its westbound round-the-world
service, adding 2,700 TEU every week to the westbound
'tarket.
Figure 4.1













1978 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87
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Some idea of overtonnage in transpacific trade can be
gleaned from a recent report produced by the Japanese
company NYK (Nippon Yusen Kaisha). The report suggested
that transpacific capacity will be 117 percent greater than
market demand by the end of 1986, equivalent to average load
factors of as low as 46 percent for the lines. NYK's
forecast shows that total transpacific shipboard capacity
will have risen by 65 percent over the three years prior to
the 1986 year-end. It noted that far from increasing by an
annual average of 5 percent, as some U.S. sources had
suggested, cargo volumes in Far East/U.S• markets will
probably decline by 10 percent this year.
Transatlantic Trade
As of November 1, 1985, there was a total of
forty-three separate services being provided by thirty-seven
carriers between Scandinavia, the Baltic, North West Europe,
the U.K. and Eire and ports on the St•Lawrence, the Atlantic
Coasts of Canada and the U.S., and the Gulf Coast of the
U.S. Together they offer an annual two-way total shipboard
capacity of 3,425,638 TEU which represents a 27 percent
increase as compared to the trade capacity as at early 1984.
61.3 percent, or 449,000 TEU, of the expansion has been
introduced over the period between mid- and end-1985.
Largely because of USL's inauguration in late August 1985 of
the transatlantic leg of its eastbound round-the-world
schedule, the new services have introduced 63,107 TEU more
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into the sluggish export trade. USL constitutes the single
largest new service.
Evergreen has been an old member of this trade.
However, with the introduction of its round-the-world
service, it has replaced the every 10-day 1,800 TEU service
with weekly 2,700 TEU. Evergreen has increased its
transatlantic capacity by 117 percent.
Although the supply of slots has grown overall by 27
percent, expansion has not been evenly distributed between
east and westbound legs. Unfortunately for the carriers a
greater proportion of the additional slots, i.e. 396,000
TEU have been added to the weaker westbound market. As a
consequence, 51.4 percent of current annual capacity, some
1,761,000 TEU, covers eastbound routes, compared with
1,664,000 TEU in the more bullish export trades from Europe.
This pattern does not match the way in which trade has
grown. The containerized cargo exports from Europe to North
America, encouraged by the increasing sophistication of
consumer demand in the U.S., grew by around 14 percent
during the first six months of 1985 compared with a similar
period in 1984• Although the gain cannot match the
phenomenal 40 percent jump in containerisable cargo exports
that took place in 1984, or even the 20 percent gain shown
in 1983, it was still sufficient to ensure that, despite the
addition of 337,000 TEU since mid-1984 in westbound routes,
most carriers sailed with virtually full vessels. In total,
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the commercial westbound market from northern Europe to the
areas of North America under analysis probably amounts to
around 1.4 to 1.5 million TEU per year.
The eastbound picture looks totally different. Not
only is the commerical market about half the size of the
westbound, but it is also shrinking. Recent estimates
suggest that during the first half of 1985 it declined by
around 4 percent. As a result of this loss of traffic anc
the additional 396,000 TEU that have come on stream, most
carriers are only able to fill 45 to 50 percent of their
vessel space off the Atlantic seaboard. Utilisation levels
out of the Gulf, where neobulk commodities are increasingly
being containerized, are marginally better, while relatively
lower westbound liftings to the region mean that the trade
is generally more balanced. In the St, Lawrence operators
aim to fill up to 60 percent of outbound capacity. The
unprofitability of all eastbound trade is reinforced by the
relatively low freight rates. Prices are generally about 50
percent of westbound levels. Typical freight rates to
Europe from Atlantic Coast are around US$ 800 per 20-footer
and US$ 1,300 -1,500 for a 40-footer. Out of the Gulf,
they are even lower, generally US$ 800- 1,000 for a
40-footer. In all sectors the common complaint of carriers
is that such rates barely cover the costs involved. Such
depressed prices are not only a function of chronic
overtonnaging, but also of the relatively low value of many
24
North American exports to Europe
Europe- Middle East TradE
In the above analysis, USL's and Evergreen's presence
in the Transpacific and Transatlantic trades is not too
damaging because these trades are relatively large and are
served by numerous large carriers. However, in the Europe-
Middle East, the introduction of USL's service from both USA
and Europe to the Middle East has affected the stability of
the trade to a large extent.
USL has first called at Khor Fakkan in September 1985.
Only during February, 1986 or so, the impact on freight
rates of the overtonnaging to which USL has contributed has
really been making itself felt, and the other carriers in
the trade have begun to utter cries of alarm as to the level
of freight rates which now applies. USL is undoubtedly
proving itself to be aggressive in the way it is using
freight rates to market to shippers, but this aggression is
largely geared to offering 40-footers, whereas the trade is
primarily based around 20 feet containers. Particularly in
some trades covered in the round-the-world services, USL is
applying a marginal cost pricing concept (MC= P) where the
other traditional lines have to apply full costs to the
1
trade. Ironically, the group of ten, in an effort to
1
Group of ten includes UK's Overseas Containers Ltd and
Ellerman Lines, ScanCarriers, United Arab Shipping, the
three Continent lines in EMEC and Trident Trio,
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rationalize the tonnages deployed in the context of falling
carryings, first withdrew the 1,536 TEU OCL vessel
Discovery Bay from the trade.
According to one source within the JCS (Joint
Containter Service), the rates which carriers are now being
forced to accept are back to 1983 levels other sources were
taking the line the slide in rates in 1986 could be awful-
unless USL goes away! USL would presumably insist that its
objective is not to undercut the rest of the market on
rates, and that it does not want to be a market leader into
the Mid-East Gulf. A brief survey illustrates the downward
trend of freight rates in this trade:
(i) As of end-January, 1986, a 20 feet container freight
rate from U.K. to Dammam would be US$1,750.
(ii) As of February 10, 1986, the rate was reduced to
US$1,400 by major Conference lines.
(iii) Both Norasia and USL quoted US$1,100 TEU in the same
route.
Although Evergreen's schedule for the time being does
not cover the USA or Europe- Middle East trade, it was
annouced earlier this year that Evergreen intended to start
a 16-day service between Europe and Middle East in late May.
So far, the participation of Evergreen in the market has
been restricted to alternate calls at Jeddah, but its new
service, which will be linking up its round-the-world
services, will use three 956 TEU type vessels and cover
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Hamburg, Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Valencia, Leghorn,
Jeddah, Dubai, Dammam, Kuwait, Bahrain and Muscat. Clearly,
the downward pressure on rates will stay.
Economic Consideration- Summary
The introduction of USL's and Evergreen's round-the
world services has to a large extent increased the supply of
shipping service to the world container cargo trade.
However, in the three major markets under review, it is
obvious that the demand of shipping services has not
expanded in accordance with the increase of supply. This
situation has led to different levels of freight war in
different markets. And naturally, prices are coming down
and as a result of decreased income, some lines are showing
weak financial standings. Hapag Lloyd has found that the
transpacific trade is too competitive to stay in and
Kalander Kangaroo Line has ceased trading in view of
insufficient fund.
This chapter shows the overtonnaging problem brought
along by the round-the-world services. However, in the
following chapters, we shall analyze the marketing edges as




POTENTIAL MARKET OF THE SERVICE
In Chapter I of this paper, it was discussed that the
largest liner traffics worldwide are the trades from the Far
East to the USA (West Coast and East Coast), the so-called
Transpacific Trade and the Europe- USA trade, the
so-called Transaltantic Trade. Both the eastbound and
westbound round-the-world services are to directly cover
these two markets. Furthermore, the other traditionally
important routes such as the trades from Europe to Far East
and from USA to Far East are included in the service
schedules. Therefore, the round-the-world services should
have a sound market base (in terms of cargo volume) of cargo
support. To properly quantify the size of the potential
market of the round-the-world service, the following
aspects are to be considered:
(i) the relative importance of the trades which are
covered in the routing of the round-the-world
services,
(ii) importance of the ports (in terms of their
throughput) which are serviced directly or indirectly
by the services,
(iii) the global customer concept,
28
(iv) the through transport concept to meet market demand,
and
(v) the global pricing.
Size of The Trade
Instead of looking at the total cargo volume of the
trades under study, it is relatively more important to focus
on the trade of manufactured goods which is largely carried
by liner shipping. According to the research conducted by
the Japan Maritime Reseach Institute, the top ten largest
ocean trades in industrial manufactures in 1980 were as
follows:









Latin Amer. 25,686N. Amer,(8)
21,080Far EastUSA(9)
Latin Amer* 21,050Europe(10)
The readers would notice that the round-the-world
services virtually cover all above major trades except
29
Europe- Africa trade and the Latin America trade. Africa
is not included in the schedule in view of geographical
reasons. It is because most cargo to and from Africa is for
either west Africa (Nigeria) or South Africa, Both areas are
on the oppositie side of the Suez Canel and will take more
than 16 days to make extra calls at these areas, which
time-wise may not be economically feasible to the
round-the-world services.
That Latin America is not included in the routing is
because of two major problems:
(i) geographical problem: it takes extra 7-10 days
to call at Latin American ports (depending on East or
West Coast), and
(ii) political problem: some Latin American countries such
as Peru and Ecuador are reserving loading rights of
all cargoes to their national lines whilst foreign
lines are not allowed to lift cargo to/from these
countries except in special circumstances (such as
lifting of aid-cargo which is usually carried by the
national line of the country which makes the
donation). Therefore, there are limited flows
commercially available to justify direct calls at
these countries.
Nevertheless, the total worldwide trade in industrial
manufactures in 1980 was around US$ 442,351 million, and
the round-the-world services cover roughly 55.8 percent of
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the total world trade.
From another angle, if one looks at the container flows
volume of each port, following observations will be made:
The top 10 largest container throughput ports are as











(A full list of the top 20 container ports and their
1
throughput in 1984 and 1983 is attached in Appendix 2 of
this paper.)
The routing of USL's round-the-world service covers
almost all above 20 top largest ports in its direct
calling ports except the. ports in Europe where USL does not
put its marketing priority in. For Evergreen, all above 20
largest ports are included.
1Containerization International, December 1985 P.67.
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According to a recent survey conducted by the
Containerization International (Dec., 1985), the world total
of container movements recorded in 1984, compiled from data
supplied by about 350 port authorities, reached 52,714,948
TEU compared with the 1983 figure of 45,569,690 TEU. This
apparent increase of 15.8 percent conceals a real growth
rate of 17 percent based on statistical returns from
locations reporting data for both years. Using these
statistics as basis, we can calculate that the ports covered
in USL's round-the-world service schedule handled 34 percent
of worldwide container traffic in 1984, whilst ports covered
in Evergreen's service handled 37.9 percent of worldwide
container traffic. These figures clearly show that there
should be sufficient cargo available in the routing of the
round-the-world service. The remaining problem is whether
the services offer a suitable product and proper pricing to
meet the market demand.
The Global Customer Concept-
A Product to Meet Market Demand
In traditional shipping industry, major shipping lines
are normally strong in particular markets for example,
Overseas Container Line has been very successful in the Far
East/Europe trade and Sealand has been important in the Far
East/USA trade. In terms of product management, these
services offer a particular product to their customers and
only meet their customers' demand if their customers so
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happen have to ship their goods in those directions.
However, some major shippers, most of them are international
trading houses and large chain department stores who buy
their goods from all over the world, require to ship their
cargo with different shipping companies to different
destinations, i.e• to use Overseas Container Line from U.K.
to Hong Kong and to use Sealand from USA West Coast to Kobe.
This arrangement not only complicates the shipping
procedure/management of the shipper, but also creates
problems to the shipper to establish an international
shipping policy because more than one shipping companies
are involved in their worldwide transport network.
Furthermore, the bargaining power of shipper with individual
shipping company is weakened because in a particular trade,
the shipper does not have the economy of scale in terms of
shipping volume.
The round-the-world services have solved these
problems. It was discussed in the earlier paragraphs that
the round-the-world services, with their additional feeder
connections, are able to virtually carry all cargo from any
particular point in the world to any other particular point.
Therefore, these services can introduce the Global
Customer concept that covers services to the customers to
carry their cargo worldwide with one single shipping
company. This concept has obviously been accepted by some
important shippers the big names in retail business in the
USA such as Sears, Nike and big trading houses in Japan such
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as Marubeni and C. Itoh have all reportedly joined the
international shipping arrangement network with the round-
the-world services. Although these big accounts would most
likely not exclusively support the round-the-world services
(in order to maintain bargaining power with various
shipping lines), the support from these major accounts will
definitely become the backbone of the round-the-world
shipping services.
Through Transport- Worldwide Distribution
Through the years, transport industry has been studying
the possibilities to provide total through transport service
to its customers. The customers' needs in transportation
are to bring their cargo from the doors of their factories
to the doors of the cargo receivers (the consignees).
However, traditional shipping companies have been only
providing services to carry cargo (and accepting
liabilities) from the gateway of the cargo receiving station
of the loading port to the cargo delivery station at the
discharge port. All inland transportation arrangements are
not included in the traditional shipping business. This
port-to-port arrangement does not fully meet market demand
because customers have to look for other transportation
services such as trucking services to carry their cargo from
door of their factories to the cargo receiving station at
the loading port, and transport arrangement from the cargo
delivery station at the discharge port to the doors of the
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factories or godown of the consignees
This situation has been slightly improved during the
recent years when all the large international shipping
companies, particularly those serving the North America
trade and Europe trades, have established services and
charges for the major inland points in North America (mainly
Mid West) and Europe (mainly Northwest Continent). This
particular shipping service concept has been applied
successfully in the round-the-world services. It is because
the round-the-world services provide through transport
services not only between two points covered by traditional
shipping routes but also to almost each and every major or
minor port worldwide. Therefore, in terms of effective
distribution, the round-the-world services have their
marketing edges over traditional shipping services.
Global Pricing
In the traditional shipping business where the markets
are separated by trades, the pricing policy of the shipping
services is a definite geographical area where demand and
supply of shipping services are confronted with each other
and a price of transport (freight rate) is established.
Most maritime economists agree that the pricing of the liner
shipping is close to the model of a free competition market.
The typical features of such a market are:
(i) there is a great number of shipowners who compete for
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the cargoes of numerous shippers,
(ii) none of the shipowners or shippers is big enough to
control the market,
(iii) entry to the market is relatively easy.
However, because of (close to) free competition, the
pricing mechanisms of each shipping routes are different and
have their unique terms/currency/charges on even the same
commodity. In view of different structures of pricing in
different trades, also because different shipping companies
are involved in various trade routes, the global customers
would find it very difficult to ship cargo in the most
efficient and economical manner. This problem can, however,
be solved by the round-the-world service operators because
these operators can set up unique shipping programmes for
these big accounts. All shipping services offered are
under one roof, preferably in one pricing structure. This
strategy will, to a large extent, be accepted by the
international accounts because the shippers will have a very
clear picture of what their shipping bill will be in the
near future (say in next year).
Marketing Consideration- Summary
From marketing point of view, it is observed that the
round-the-world service should have successful operations.
The market size is large, the product is in general superior
to the traditional shipping services, distribution is more
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effective and most importantly, global pricing strategy is
able to be set to meet dynamic market demands. In the
following chapters, the writer shall further analyse the
services from the financial point of view to see whether the




BREAKEVEN REQUIREMENT OF SERVICE
In this chapter an analysis shall be made on the costs
of the round-the-world service, i.e. those costs which are
borne by the shipowner to produce transport services. An
estimate of revenue of the shipping services shall also be
made. The objective is to match the revenue with the costs
incurred in the services in order to ascertain a breakeven
position to evaluate the financial feasibility of the
round-the-world services under the present trading
conditions.
Generally, shipping economists distinguish four groups
of costs in liner shipping: overhead expenses, operating
expenses or vessel overheads, voyage expenses and cargo or
direct costs:
(i) Company overheads: these are considered as fixed
costs and include general costs of the firm,
marketing expenses and marine overheads (nautical,
technical, control of marine stores).
(ii) Vessel's operating expenses (vessel's overheads):
these are costs related to the maintenance of the
ships in service. They are fixed costs independent
of output; and typically include maintenance and
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repairs, surveys, insurance (hull and machinery),
manning costs, victualling, laundry, clothing, radio
and ship's stores.
(iii) Voyage costs: these are costs connected with running
the ship under normal operating conditions. They
include fuel costs, port dues and charges.
(iv) Cargo or direct costs: these are typically variable
costs as their amount varies with the quantity and
nature of the cargo handled to/from the ships. Costs
included in direct costs are costs connected with
loading and discharging of cargo and agency
commission.
In the following paragraphs, an estimate will be made
on such costs one by one and the writer shall try to match
the possible revenue with costs. However, in view of the
similar nature of Evergreen's service to USL's, only USL's
service shall be used for further cost/revenue review.
Company Overheads
Generally, this item stands a very smaii poriiun of
costs in liner shipping. It is mainly because the majority
of costs in operating a shipping service would be hardware,
i.e. cost of providing ships and equipment (for example,
containers). However, there is an increasing trend of
shipowners putting more efforts in marketing and public
relations and the costs of company overheads are also in an
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increasing trend.
According to the survey made by Journal de la Marine
Marchande No. 3305 in 1983, the management costs of liner
shipping between 1972 and 1983 was between 8.0 and 8.7
percent of freight revenue. Nevertheless, because of the
large revenue generating capacity of the round-the-world
service fleet, a 5% of revenue income to be reserved as
company overheads would be a fair estimate. It is necessary
to point out that we use a percentage here only for easy
calculation purpose, the nature of company overheads is
still considered a fixed cost.
Vessel Operating Expenses
This item would be the largest of the four cost items
as mentioned in the above paragraphs. Contrary to
charter-in tonnage (where no operating expenses are to be
counted and the costs of the vessel would only be the
charter hire amount), the costs of the owned vessels would
generally be included various cost items such as capital
cost (depreication and interest on capital), repairs and
maintenance (to keep the ship seaworthy), crew and related
costs and insurance premium (to provide protection against a
physical loss or damage to the ship). Nevertheless, to
properly evaluate the costs of the round-the-world service,
we should use the opportunity cost concept, i.e. to use the
market charter-hire rate as vessel's operating expenses.
The present charter-hire market indicates an average of
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around US$ 6.0 per TEU day, As large containerships have
the economy of scale, we would base on US$ 5.0 per TEU day
therefore, vessel's operating expenses per day should be:
3800 TEU x US$ 5.0 or US$ 19,000 per day. Based on a round
voyage period of 84 days, the total vessel operating
expenses would be US$ 19,000 x 84 days= US$ 1,596,000.
Voyage Costs
Voyage costs comprise fuel cost and port dues and
charges. Fuel costs are generally determined by a number of
factors such as type of engine, horse power, type of fuel
used and of course, fuel price. The age and condition of
the engines are also very important elements influencing the
level of fuel costs as are the skill and experience of the
engine department's crew. However, speed is by far the most
important determinant of fuel costs. The jumbo econships
burn 73.7 tons Marine Fuel Oil (MFO) per day as quoted by
the shipbuilders. However, in practice, this figure could
be lowered because the ships are running economical speed
at certain stretches. Marine Diesel Oil (MDO) is estimated
at around 5 tons per day. The present schedule of the
round-the-world service includes 70 sea days and 14 port
days. Therefore the total fuel cost of a round voyage would
be around:
MFO 70 sea days x 73.7 tons x US$160/ton plus
MDO 84 voyage days x 5 tons x US$250/ton
or a total of US$ 943,440.
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Port charges would be averaged at say, US$ 8,000 per
calling port. Taking a standard schedule of 13 direct
calling ports, the total port charges bill per voyage would
be 13 ports x US$8,000= US$ 104,000.
Direct Costs
Direct costs of a round-the-world container shipping
service mainly refer to cargo (and container) handling costs
Which include all costs incurred in the terminals, cargo
receiving costs which include all costs incurred outside the
terminals, inland drayage costs, agency commission and- the
most important of them all- container logistics costs.
Terminal handling costs of cargo (and containers) can
be roughly estimated at:
Far Eastern ports: US$ 250 per FEU
USA ports: US$ 300 per FEU
European ports: US$ 300 per FEU
Other ports: US$ 250 per FEU
The above rates are for one handling move, i•e• loading or
unloading of a forty-footer container.
Cargo handling costs incurred outside the container
terminals such as container stuffing costs, drayage costs
from container storage area to container freight stations
(cargo receiving station for general loose cargo), etc, are
usually for customers' account and therefore not included.
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Agency commission is generally 7.5 percent of freight
earnings which include 5 percent for the loading port agents
splitting 2.5 percent of sales commission, 2.5 percent for
document handling commission, and 2.5 percent for discharge
port agents.
Container logistics costs are now being the most
difficult monitoring item in container shipping. It is
almost impossible to accurately measure the optimal stock of
equipment in the service to meet two criteria:
- sufficient equipment to meet each and every demand of
customers, and
- minimum stock to keep the lowest container capital cost.
Nevertheless, shipping economists project that a ship/stock
ratio of 1:2 would be the most efficient stock-keeping
level. Therefore, taking the voyage days as basis (84 days),
each container would cost:
84 days x 2 x $2.5 (container capital costs plus M & R)
= US$ 420.00 per TEU.
To summarize, the estimated costs of operating a round
voyage of the round-the-world services are:
(i) fixed cost:
-vessel operating expenses US$1,596,000
-bunker consumption US$ 943,440
-port charges US$ 104,000
Total fixed costs US$2,643,440
(ii) variable costs:
-terminal handling costs (loading and unloading)
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Average: US$ 560 per FEU
-agents commission 7.5% of freight
-container and logistics US$ 420 per FEU
5% of freight-company overheads
Total variable costs US$980 per FEU plus
12.5% of freight
Freight Income
After estimating the costs, the following paragraph
will study the freight income of the round-the-world
service. Generally, the pricing of the shipping services is
set by the respective shipping Conference(s). The existing
Conferences governing the trades in the round-the-world
services are:
Transpacific v.v. eastbound: ANERA (Asia North America
Rate Agreement)
westbound: TIRA (Transpacific Westbound
Rate Agreement)
Europe- USA: TAFC (TransAtlantic Freight Conference)
Europe- F.E.v.v.: FEFC (Far East Freight Conference).
Basically, there are three types of Conference rates:
(i) commodity rates
(ii) class rates
(iii) commodity and class rates.
In the commodity tariffs, a separate rate is indicated for
each commodity. As many as several hundred commodities are
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enumerated in the tariffs. In the class tariff, specific
commodities are grouped into classes, the number of which
may be between as few as six and as many as thirty or forty.
A definite rate is attributed to each class. Commodity and
class tariffs are a combination of the two basic systems
defined above. As it was discussed in Chapter IV, the
pricing of shipping in a particular trade is purely
determined by demand and supply. The freight market
structure is a complicated subject and is not relevant to
this research subject therefore, the writer shall not
further elaborate on this subject. The average freight
rates in respective trades, however, are understandably as
follows:
US$1,800 per FEUTranspacific eastbound
US$1,500 per FEUwestbound
US$2,200 per FEUEurope- USA v.v.
US$1,500 per FEUEurope- Far East
US$2,500 per FEUFar East- Europe
Weighted average, taken into account potential volume
of the trade, should be in a region of US$1,900 per FEU in
the overall voyage of a round-the-world service sailing. As
regards the feeder service ports, although the through
freight rates are likely higher than US$1,900 per FEU, the
net freight rates contributing to the main service after
deducting the feeder service costs, should fall into the
neighbourhood of US$1,900 per FEU. The average rate of US$




The following formula shall be applied:
TFC (Total Fixed Cost)
Breakeven revenue
contribution margin%
The total fixed costs as estimated above are
US$2,643,440. The variable costs are 12.5% plus $980/1,900
= 51.58%, or a total of 64.08%. The contribution margin
will be: 100%- 64.08%= 35.92%.




That is, the round-the-world service operators need a
freight revenue of US$ 7.36 million every 80-85 days for
their services to achieve a breakeven position. USL,
running a weekly schedule, would require an annual turnover
of US$ 382,700,000 and Evergreen would need more or less the
same business volume as it has a bigger number of ships but
less capacity per vessel.
To put the freight revenue into perspective, USL would
have to lift US$7.36 million/US$ 1,900 per FEU or 3,874 FEU
support per round voyage. If we evenly divide this
requirement in the three main stretches of the service, it
shows that USL would require an average of 1,291 FEU/1,900
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FEU or 68% occupancy to maintain a breakeven position.
Required Market Share
To further evaluate the position of a round-the-world
service in terms of required market share (RMS), a breakeven
position of the service would require a yearly support based
on the following calculations:
No. of sailings per annum: 52 (weekly service)
Average requirement per stretch per sailing: 1,291 FEU
Requirement per annum per stretch:
52 sailings x 1,291 FEU= 67,132 FEU
or =134,264 TEU.
According to the recent survey conducted by the
Planning and Research Department of Orient Overseas
Container Lines (a subsidiary of C. Y. Tung Group), the total
container traffic in 1985 was as follows:
1,565,000 TEUFar East transpacific (West Coast)
757,000 TEU(East Coast)
354,000 TEUAtlantic- Europe
614,000 TEUEurope- Far East
Therefore, by straight calculations, USL would require
the following market shares in respective trades to keep
its round-the-world service breakeven:
Far East transpacific (West and East Coast):
134,264/2,322,000= 6%
134,264/ 354,000 =38%Atlantic- Europe
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134,264/ 614,000 =22%Europe- Far East
402,792/3,290,000 =12%Total three stretches
Purely looking at the above figures, one could easily
conclude that, under the severely competitive shipping
market today, it is not impossible to obtain a 6% market
share in the transpacific trade particularly considering the
marketing edges of a round-the-world service however, it
would be highly unrealistic to project a market share of
38% in the Atlantic- Europe trade and 22% in the Europe-
Far East trade. Especially the Europe- Far East trade
which is not a traditionally developed trade for USL, a
share of 22% appears impossible to achieve in the near
future. A realistic estimate is to achieve an average
12 percent in total three stretches.
USL's Own Expectation
The above calculation/estimation shows the requirement
of carryings for USL's round-the-world service and we assume
the requirement is similar to Evergreen's service. Below the
writer shall, based on the filing of USL with the U. S.
Maritime Administration on August 23, 1985 in support of the
carrier's request to continue unsubsidised round-the-world
railings, analyse what USL expects to carry in the service
when the service is in full operation.
In submitting its request, USL gave an estimate of
likely cargo carryings on the service when it is fully
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implemented. The carryings are shown in a summary form in
Table 6.1 and are broken down by loading ports in Table 6.2.
On the basis of the carryings listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2,
it can be seen that USL expects to load and discharge 4,665
FEU per week. This volume means that USL's per slot
utilization for one round voyage is 2.08 FEU, a figure which
is lower than the three boxes per slot ratio frequently
assumed for multi-port round-the-world deployment. Overall
vessel utilization on one round voyage would, on the basis
of these figures, average out at a fairly respectable 73.7
percent, which if sustained is higher than the level which
USL needs to reach if it is to breakeven• However, as Table
6.1 indicates, the rate of utilization varies from sector to
sector, with the econships achieving 60.9 percent out of New
York, 69.2 percent out of Rotterdam, 88.8 percent out of
Marseilles-Fos (the highest level), 64.3 percent out of Khor
Fakkan, 84.6 percent out of Yokohama and 74.3 percent out of
The above figures, prima facie, show that USL could
have maintained its round-the-world service at a profit.
However, one should bear in mind that the above is USL's
internal projections. The effect resulting from the
increase of tonnage put in by USL and Evergreen has not been
taken into account. Therefore, the writer would only
conclude that the above prognosis is only USL's wishful





ESTIMATED CARRYINGS OF USL WHEN ALL 12 NEWBUILDING
ARE IN ROUND-THE-WORLD SERVICE (IN FEU)
Origin (load ports) Destination FEU/week Utilization
US East Coast North Europe 425 1900%
Mediterranean 7.9175
Mid East/India 194 8.7
Far East 356 11.4
Total loaded ex US East Coast 1,150 51.3%
Total ex US, incl. West Coast 1,256 56.4
60.9Total incl. Far East/Europe 1 ,365
90 .1%Mid-East/India 385North Europe
440 19.6Far East
Total carryings ex North Europe
1,550 69.2%incl. FEU loaded in US
12.00270Mid-East/IndiaMediterranean
15.4345Far East
Total carryings ex Med incl




Total carryings ex Mid-East/
India, North Europe and US excl
64.3%1,441discharged
12.3%275US West CoastFar East
57.31,285US East Coast
4.5100North Europe
Total carryings ex Far East,
84.6%1,895incl. previous loadings
5.1%115North EuropeUS West Coast
Total carrying ex US West Coast
74301,665including previous carryings
4,665Grand Total
Source: USL filing to U5 Maritime hdministration or zolotoJ
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TABLE 6.2
BREAKDOWN OF PROJECTED WEEKLY CARRYINGS OF USL
BY LOADING PORTS AND DESTINATIONS
Discharge
F.EasLoad Ports N.EuropeFEU/weel USEC ME/Ind USWC
Savannah 523 133 150 240
70Savannah MLB 70
New York 415 255 60 100




40 3095-West Coast ISC 165
-Mid-East Gulf
Singapore









Note: MLB= minilandbridge, ISC= Indian Sub-Continent
Source: USL filing to US Maritime Administration of 23/8/85.
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CHAPTER VII
RECOMMENDATION- PROPOSED ACTION PLAN
As it was discussed in the earlier chapters, the major
problems in the present round-the-world services are mainly
the requirement of a large cargo support and the current low
freight level as a result of the overtonnage situation in
the main stretches of services. It was also discussed that
the services have marketing edges over conventional shipping
services. However, to keep the services survive, the
present round-the-world services operators have to adjust
their modus operandi to improve its cargo support by
expanding their market and, on the other hand, to try to
improve their freight rate levels.
Market Expansion
In Chapter III, it was discussed that the present
round-the-world services are running a West-East route in
the northern hemisphere. However, due to historical
reasons, both Evergreen and USL are not covering certain
major trades in their schedules. For example, USL vessels
only schedule to call at Felixstowe and Rotterdam, other
European ports are covered by feeder connections. Evergreen
vessels do not schedule to call at Arabian Gulf or Red Sea
ports. The uncovered major markets at least include the
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following trades for USL and Evergreen:
USL: Atlantic- Northwest Continent
Far East- Northwest Continent
Far East- Caribbean Sea ports
Evergreen: Atlantic- Arabian Gulf ports
Far East- Arabian Gulf ports
Atlantic- Indian Sub-Continent
Indian Sub-Continent- Pacific and Atlantic
Although it can be argued that these trades are all
covered by USL and Evergreen under transhipment
arrangements, it is quite obvious that these major liner
trades are covered by dozens of international containership
operators which serve these trades directly. Under the
severe competition in the shipping industry today, a
transhipment service shall not produce any satisfactory
results for the indirect operators. Therefore, USL and
Evergreen virtually give up these markets.
The constraint of covering these ports directly in t he
existing route is of course the 84 days schedule of USL and
77 days schedule of Evergreen which do not allow extra time
for additional port calls. To further cover the trades as
mentioned above, additional voyage days must be included.
Two alternatives can be considered to increase the number
of ships to 14 (in case of USL) and the voyage days to 98
days, or to maintain the present number of ships to 12 and
to decrease the frequency of service to every eight days
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instead of weekly. It is suggested that, despite the
present overtonnage situation, USL (similar theory applies
to Evergreen) should maintain a weekly schedule by calling
additional ports and increasing the number of ships to 14.
It is because, in terms of marketing and operations
arrangment, it is more impressive to name the product in
any particular port that sails every Saturday. It is also
more convenient operationally to arrange terminal facilities
every Saturday in New York, Monday in Baltimore, etc.
To include major European ports in USL's route,
according to the trade statistics as shown in Chapter V, USL
virtually has the access of additional 16 percent of the
world trade (in manufactured goods) or roughly an increase
of some 29 percent of its present available market size.
Another major scenario is that both round-the-world
services have not included the services of Africa and
Australia, not even by feeder services. The trade between
Europe and Africa is considered the fourth largest liner
trade worldwide. Both African and Australian continents are
of course too remote to the direct sailings of round-the-
world services. USL and Evergreen should however consider to
join force with the existing Australian and African trades
operators. If there are links between Australia/Africa and
the main round-the-world services, it is virtually able to
provide full shipping services from every corner of the
world to Australia or Africa and vice versa. A joint force
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with existing operators on South-North feedering has the
merit of a saving of additional capital costs and increased
connections to new markets. Understandably, Evergreen is
actively pursuing this idea in the Australian trade with
Kaohsiung as a transhipment centre. Hopefully by the end of
1986, Evergreen will link up the Australia trade with its
round-the-world connections.
Rationalization of Freight Rates
The present rate-cuttings of USL and Evergreen in each
and every new markets are believed temporary measures. Once
they obtain a firm hold in a particular trade, they should
catch up their freight rates to the ordinary trade level.
It is only sensible that all lines serving in a trade should
charge their rates at a level that the income can cover
capital and operational costs in the long run. Otherwise, no
line can survive in red-ink results over the years.
Therefore, the round-the-world service operators should
not base their pricing on their marginal costs. Pricing
reflecting the market demand and supply in a particular
trade should be used. For example, in the Europe- Middle
East trade, the market pricing is in the range of US$1,700
per TEU, the round-the-world operators, even with a
marginal-cost price of US$1,200 per TEU, should adopt the
market price of US$1,700. It is, therefore, worthwhile to
recncider the recommendation made in Chapter V as regards
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global pricing policy of the round-the-world services.
Nevertheless, in practice, it is believed that the
round-the-world operators shall trade off between market
price and marginal-cost pricing in any particular route
covered by their services.
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CHAPTER VIII
FUTURE PROJECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
Persistent rumours about the viability of USL, with its
huge capital commitment in a falling market, prompted the
line to make press statements about its financial health.
While the jumbo-sized newbuildings are not entirely to blame
for the decline in USL's future, it is a sobering throught
that only two and half years ago, proponents of this new
1
class of slow Panamax containership were proclaiming that
they would be able to breakeven if 30 percent loaded. This
is of course impossible taking into consideration the low
freight rate level nowadays as evidenced by the breakeven
calculations shown in Chapter VI of this paper.
Having invested around US$ 1 billion in a new fleet
of 2,728 TEU containerships, Evergreen has gone ahead with a
further order for four 3,400 TEU newbui l dings from Japan's
Onomichi, which will be the second largest class of such
ship ever built. Since 1978, the size of a typical ship on
the three main stretches (transpacific, transatlantic and
Europe- Middle East/Far East) has increased from about
2
1,000 TEU to about 2,200 TEU and is still rising. At the
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1
Panama Canel maximum width
2
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 13, 1986 P.40.
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same time, however, the growth of worldwide container
movements has been slowing- even after taking into account
the significant jump of 14 percent in 1984.
Future Container Trade Market
According to CSR Consultancy as published in the
Lloyd's List issue of April 19, 1985, the world
containerised traffic in 1990 is estimated to be around 410
million tons, as compared to 287 million tons in 1982 and
347 million tons in 1986• Containerization will have forged
ahead further, especially in the LDC (lesser developed
countries) where improvements in port facilities and
hinterland infrastructure are being built. LDC (including
Latin America, the Near and Middle East) are expected to be
in the region of 148 million tons, which is not less than 36
percent of the total world traffic. In particular, the South
and East Asian, the so-called Newly Industrialized
Countries, will become even more prominent than at present
because of their growing export trades of manufactured
goods.
The traditional liner services, impressive a5 Lnelr
historic concept may have been, will gradually be reduced to
merely the seaborne link in intermodal transport system. As
was discussed in Chapter V, the concept of total transport
service will be applied by more shipping lines and the
traditional shipping services are switching to a
total transport industry. The round-the-world services
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shall play an important role in the through transport links.
Seaborne end-to-end or round-the-world services operated by
one, a few, or a combination of many ship operators for the
benefit of their own, some or many other intermodal
transport services offered in the marketplace will
constitute this seaborne transportation link in a total
system used by many and without particular traditional
identity.
The Newcomers and The Old Tonnage
The major stumbling block for newcomers into the
round-the-world services is how do they get- rid of the
existing ships? The candidates for the round-the-world
services are usually the existing major containership
operators who are already operating a large fleet of
container ships. These ships are, however, too small to run
a round-the-world service and too young to be scrapped.
It is also not suitable to inject these tonnage into
other trades with smaller scale (like the trades between
Singapore and East Asia) becasue such small trades are not
able to provide sufficient support for these tonnage. Should
these operators put new tonnage into the trade regardless of
the overtonnage situation, the already weak freight market
will definitely become weaker. It is the common major
problem for the existing traditional shipping lines. It is,
however, expected that the number of shipping lines
operating in the round-the-world services will increase
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because of the principal merits of the service including the
marketing advantages as listed in Chapter V and the scale of
III.
To fulfill the needs of cargo support,' more areas will
be included in the round-the-world market routes, be it
directly or indirectly. The African continent, in
particular West Africa and South Africa, shall become the
major markets. Australia and New Zealand shall also be
covered by transhipment service.
Protectionism Versus Liberalism
Last but definitely not the least, the major influence
to the future international shipping market and the
round-the-world shipping services will be the protectionism
imposed by various countries including some developed
countries. The protectionism of developing countries is
considered a sole means of changing the pattern of
international division of labour in maritime transport.
That is why it is increasingly in shipping policies of
developing countries provoking a sharp criticism from the
defenders of the principles of free and fair competition in
sea transport.
Another sphere of controversy between shipping
protectionism and liberalism is the so-called shipping
economy of hardware as discussed in Chapter II and Chapter
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conflict between USA and Europe. The well-known weakness of
the American-flag shipping and its low competitiveness due
to high operating costs force the U.S. Government to adopt
an extremely wide range of protectionist measures which
prevent its merchant marine from decline. The increasing
participation of USL in carrying of government cargo and aid
cargo is a typical example.
The most important international agreement affecting
the international seaborne trade and the expansion of the
round-the-world services will prehaps be the UNCTAD (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development) Code of Conduct
of Liner Conferences. The Code has been put in force since
October 1983 and has adopted a principle by letting 20
percent of the trade to the third countries, 40 percent
being reserved for the exporter and another 40 percent for
the importer. This Code has not been made compulsory to
every UN member country, but it indeed is being used by
most of the third world shipping lines to avoid free
competition from the overseas shipping competitors.
Under all these conditions and possibilities of
expansion, how far the existing round-the-world operators
can expand their services has as yet to be seen. The joint
service of Orient Overseas Container Lines, Kawasaki and
Nepture Orient Lines already announced their joining the
round-the-world service club from April this year. How this
would affect the decision of the other major operators will
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TOP 20 CONTAINERSHIP OPERATORS ON THE BASIS OF PROJECTED
TOTAL TEU SLOTS IN SERVICE BY JANUARY 1987
Country Present Total Newbuildings Total Jan.87
TaiwanEvergreen 85,714 17,350 103,094
U.S. Lines 78,850USA 14,576 94,426
Sea-Land USA 61,945 11,658 73,603
Maersk Denmarl 59,317 3,300 62,617
OOCL HK 33,755 48,75515,000
Hapag-Lloyd W.Ger 45,179 48,0032,824
M.O.S.K. Japan 35,662 9,714 45,376
44,899 44,899OCL Britisl











7,401POL Poland 18,763 26 ,164
934,743145,517Total TEU 789,226
2,468,613256,850World total TEU 2,211,763
37.956.7share of top 20 35.7
Source: Containerizational International Sept. 1985
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APPENDIX 2
CONTAINER TRAFFIC- TOP TWENTY CONTAINER PORTS
(IN TEU)
19831984
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1. Containerization International (monthly)
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